than one calendar year, those month/day variables indicate the dates of the year during which the war endured. So, a war beginning on March 15, 1980 and ending on April 15, 1981 would have for the 1980 line of data an exit month of December and exit date of 31, and for the 1981 line of data the entry month would be January and the entry date would be 1.
Note that there are a small set of wars for which COW codes short ceasefires during the war. For this data set, this means that a multiyear war may have a stop month/date coding other than December 31 for a year other than the last year of the war, and conversely it may have a start month/date coding other than January 1 for a year other than the first year of war. For wars in which a ceasefire started and stopped within a single calendar year, we created a second set of variables describing second start/end months and dates.
The data set includes information on which states fought on the side of the initiator and on the side of the target during the year of the line of data. A state is included as an allied belligerent if it fought at any point during that year.
An important issue is determining exactly how a state entered a war, whether it attacked to start a war, it entered an ongoing war because it was attacked, or it entered an ongoing war by choice, that is, by declaring war or by launching an attack against a belligerent already fighting a war. If a state chooses to enter a war after it has already begun, it is listed as the initiator in a separate line of data. That is, Italy is not an initial belligerent at the onset of World War I in 1914, but declares war in 1915, and hence there is a separate line of data identifying Italy as an initiator in 1915. There is a separate, dichotomous variable identifying such states as joiners. Any state entering an ongoing war (that is, declaring war against or attacking a state that is already a belligerent) by choice after it has begun is coded as a joiner.
Some states enter wars after they have begun because they are attacked, such as Germany invading Norway in 1940 after World War II has broken out. Such instances are identified as separate lines of data, Germany initiating against Norway. Note that in cases such as this the attacking state is not coded as a joiner, because it is initiating against a state that is not currently a belligerent.
We have two war identification variables. The first is a variable for which each initiator-target pairing gets the same coding for all years of the war. So, the five lines of data for the [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] Germany-Soviet Union war all get the same coding, but the Germany-Norway 1940 war gets a different coding. The second variable identifies all initiator-target codings with the same, larger war. So, all initiator-target cases within World War II (Germany-Soviet Union, Japan-US, Germany-Norway, etc.) get the same coding for this second variable. If war stopped temporarily and restarted during that year, this is the numerical code for the month when the war restarted (-9 if no temporary stoppage during that year) date_entry02
If war stopped temporarily and restarted during that year, this is the date when the war restarted (-9 if no temporary stoppage during that year) month_exit02
If war stopped temporarily and restarted during that year, this is the numerical code for the month when the war stopped the second time (-9 if no stoppage during that year) date_exit02
If war stopped temporarily and restarted during that year, this is the date when the war stopped the second time (-9 if no second stoppage during that year) init_war_id This is an identification number identifying each initiator-target dyad larger_war_id This is an identification number identifying each larger war; sometimes a larger war will include multiple initiator-target dyads init_war_name Name of the initiator-target dyad larger_war_name Name of the larger war joiner Coded 1 if the init_ccode state for this line of data joined the war (that is, the larger_war_id) after the war started, that is, the state did not launch the attack that started the war. If the init_ccode state did launch the attack that started the war, this variable is coded 0.
adv2name Name of ally of target (note that there are variables adv2name through adv14name, each identifying different target allies; note that -9 is the missing value, no target ally) adv2ccode COW country code of ally of target (note that there are variables adv2ccode through adv14ccode, each describing identifying allies; note that -9 is the missing value, no target ally) ally1name Name of ally of initiator (note that there are variables ally1name through ally16name, each identifying different initiator allies; note that -9 is the missing value, no initiator ally) ally1ccode COW country code of ally of initiator (note that there are variables ally1ccode through ally16ccode, each identifying different initiator allies; note that -9 is the missing value, no initiator ally) 4 That is, this is not at this point an incident of interstate violence (though Guatemala made accusations of Salvadoran cooperation with the rebels at this stage), and it is not an instance of violence initiated by Guatemala. A better coding is to code El Salvador as initiating the war on July 9. Barillas' May 27 incursion was quelled in a battle on June 11, and it appeared that peace was at hand in the latter half of June. However, on July 9, the frequently drunken Salvadoran Minister of War General Tomás Regalado led a Salvadoran invasion of Guatemala.
5 US Envoy to Central America William Merry cabled the State Department on July 10 that, "Salvadorian general commanding forced fight on Guatemalan territory."
6 Media reports at the time also conveyed that El Salvador initiated the war, such as, "Hostilities were begun by a large force of San Salvador troops invading Guatemala," 7 and, "Cable advices received today from the American secretary of legation at Guatemala City indicate that the hostilities reported between the forces of Guatemala and Salvador were precipitated by the action of one of the Salvadorean generals commanding a force on the frontier in crossing into Guatemala." 8 One source claims that Guatemala initiated the war, as the authors claimed to have found "only one course to indicate the initiator; that source puts the burden on Estrada Cabrera and Guatemala. Karnes (1961, 185-6) writes: 'Guatemalan troops were successful in repulsing [the invading exiles], and, blaming Honduras and El Salvador in particular for permitting the attacks, Estrada Cabrera mounted an offense against them.'" 9 However, Karnes does not directly mention the July 9 Salvadoran invasion in his brief discussion of the war, and the above sources do seem to indicate that El Salvador did launch an attack on July 9. 10 Further, Karnes indirectly alludes to Regalado's invasion as raising the intensity of the conflict to the level of interstate war: "By July the skirmishes had ripened into war. Salvadorean casualties reached the thousands, and the commanding general, former President Tomás Regalado, was killed." 11 In short, we code El Salvador as initiating war against Guatemala on July 9. Honduras did not join El Salvador's July 9 attack, but Guatemala did invade Honduras on July 13. 12 We code Guatemala as initiating against Honduras on July 13.
10. Fourth Central American War. COW codes Nicaragua as initiating against Honduras and El Salvador on February 19, 1907 . However, it appears that El Salvador was initially neutral, but then intervened in the war on Honduras' behalf on March 11. El Salvador and Honduras do not formally declare war on each other until March 11. 13 Through early March, El Salvador remained on the sideline of the war.
14 Eventually, El Salvador elected to intervene in the defense of Honduras, its ally. 15 Specifically, several thousand Salvadoran soldiers joined with Honduran forces around March 11, and marched into combat with Nicaraguan forces. 16 Hence, we retain COW's coding of Nicaragua initiating against Honduras on February 19, but now code El Salvador as initiating against Nicaragua on March 11.
11. World War I. 17 Much of the below discussion identifies the individual war dyads within World War I that IWD identifies.
A. Japan should be coded as joining Britain in 1914, and then fighting until the end of the war. Japan initially seizes some German owned Pacific islands, and then launches a major military operation against German forces at Tsingtao, where there were 199 Germans killed in action (KIA), 415 Japanese KIA, and 13 British KIA. 18 Japan should be coded as being a belligerent for the rest of the war, for two reasons. One, Japan signs the Versailles Treaty. Two, Japan engages in military operations against Germany after Tsingtao. Specifically, Japan sent a cruiser and eight destroyers to Malta in 1917 for convoy duty. Eventually two more cruisers and four more destroyers were sent. Also, two British trawlers and two British destroyers were manned by Japanese crews. One Japanese destroyer was torpedoed. 24 The crews of this flotilla exceeded 1000 troops; the aircraft carrier HMS Vindictive alone had a crew of nearly 700. This flotilla saw combat. On December 16, British naval forces bombarded Soviet positions at Wesenberg (also known as Rakvere) in Estonia. 25 In late December, there were clashes between British and Soviet vessels, leading to the capture of two Soviet destroyers. 26 In May 1919, there was an indecisive naval engagement with the Russian navy, as the flotilla supported the Estonian army and navy. The British Baltic Squadron helped the Estonians capture the Russian fortress of Krasnaya Gorka on June 15, and on June 17 the force torpedoed the Russian cruiser Oleg. There was also a British air raid on the Russian naval base at Kronstadt on July 30, and another air raid/coastal motor boat attack on Kronstadt, knocking out two battleships and other units. The Anglo-French naval force fired on Russo-German forces at Daugavgrĭva on October 15. On December 25, 1919, most of the British force was sent home, leaving only a cruiser and several destroyers. In total, the British force had disabled two Russian battleships. It also destroyed a cruiser, three destroyers, a submarine depot ship, two submarines, four torpedo boats, and several smaller vessels. Britain lost a light cruiser, two destroyers, a submarine, four mine sweepers, nine coastal torpedo boats, and smaller vessels. It suffered 171 KIA. We date French entry into the war to December 20, 1918 , when French vessels were dispatched to the Baltic. French vessels involved in the war included two cruisers, Gueydon and Montcalm, each of which had a crew of 570. There was also the torpedo gunboat Dunois, with a crew of 138, as well as the destroyer Garnier, a similar, slightly larger destroyer, Lestin, and at least three smaller escort vessels. Regarding pre-1920 violence, one example might be Russo-Polish clashes near Bialystock and Brest-Litovsk in December 1918. However, the presence of German forces prevented any substantial violence at that time. 30 Another potential example is the conflict between Russian and Polish forces at Bereza Kartuska in February 1919. However, Polish forces initiated military conflict by entering this small township. This was a very minor incident involving only 62
Polish soldiers capturing about 80 Soviet soldiers. 31 The insignificance of this clash is demonstrated by the perseverance of political contacts between Poland and Russia.
32 Regarding Russo-Polish clashes in March-April 1919, these minor events are clearly Poland initiating actions against Russia, not the reverse. Russia had taken control of Wilno in sovereign Lithuania, and Poland reacted by dispatching forces to eject Russian forces from Wilno, accomplishing this mission in late April. 33 Note that during this period it was Poland that took the initiative to seize territory in the turmoil of the Russian Civil War, capturing from February to October 1919 (including Vilna on April 21) contested border areas with substantial numbers of ethnic Poles. The Poles renewed their offensive when Russia demanded Polish evacuation of these areas. 34 In his definitive history of the war, Norman Davies claimed that in this first phase "the initiative lay with the Poles."
35 This is not surprising, as the Russians wanted to avoid conflict with Poland to focus on fending off foreign forces during its own civil war.
36
Some might also point to Soviet Russia's "Target Vistula" plan, declared in November 1918, as Soviet war initiation. Despite its grandiose vision of a march to Warsaw, it amounted to nothing more than revolutionary rhetoric, the formation of the Soviet Western Army, and a reconnaissance in depth as far as the River Bug. Tellingly, there were no notable military clashes in this operation, as Soviet forces were entering territory just evacuated by German forces and did not seek to engage Polish forces. Davies wrote: "It is problematical whether …'Target Vistula' was intended to bring the Red army as conquering heroes into Warsaw. Its name suggests so. Yet the extremely tentative phrasing of its directives and the extremely parlous state of the Western Army suggest otherwise. 'Target Vistula' was probably no more than a phrase inspired by revolutionary bravado." 37 Another scholar noted, "The Russian Western Army had never been intended to fight its way to the Vistula: it was far too weak." provide comprehensive casualty figures. The discussion in one Polish-language history of the conflict sheds doubt on the proposition that there were at least 1000 battle deaths. This source observes that the largest battle occurred at Seiny on September 22, in which about 40 were killed in total. It also reports that during the attack on Vilnius on October 9, each Polish regiment reported only "several killed." The Poles entered Vilnius with about 20,000 troops, and given that regiments usually number in the low thousands each, that means that if there were perhaps a half dozen or so regiments each suffering only several killed, the total number of dead on the Polish side in the Vilnius was at the most in the low dozens. 41 In short, the best available evidence, scarce as is, indicates that the total battle deaths in the Lithuania-Poland conflict were likely far short of 1000.
16. China-Japan War, 1937-1945. COW 4.0 codes a China-Japan War as starting in 1937 and ending on December 6, 1941, with a Japanese victory. China then gets folded in as a participant in World War II, a separate COW war. It is inappropriate to code China-Japan hostilities as ending in 1941, and it is inappropriate to code Japan as winning. China and Japan did not cease hostilities at this time, nor did they sign a peace treaty or ceasefire. Combat was ongoing throughout December; for example, the Third Battle of Changsha starts on December 19, 1941 , in which Japan's 11 th Corps attacks 37 Chinese divisions defending the city. In that battle alone, China claimed to have inflicted 6000 Japanese KIA. 42 The more appropriate approach is to code Japan as initiating war against China in 1937, and that war does not end until the Japanese surrender to the Allies in 1945. As a member of the Allies, China should be coded as the victor. 68 There were perhaps a bit more than that. Micheal Clodfelter indicates 62 dead at battle of Ifni in 1957, and then an additional 292 KIA in January 1958 battle at Etchebera. 69 Still, even the high end of these figures are well short of the 1000 KIA threshold. John Mercer indicated the Spanish deployment of 9000 troops, and the French deployment of 5000 troops.
21. There are a number of issues regarding the Vietnam War. COW lists Cambodia as a participant in the Vietnam War, on the US side, entering the war on March 1, 1970, and suffering 2500 casualties. 71 This decision seems to come from the assumption that "South Vietnam also received support from five other states that sent troops into the war (South Korea, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Australia)." 72 However, there is no indication that Cambodia ever sent such troops to fight in South Vietnam. One of the definitive statistical sources on Vietnam does not list Cambodia as a nation deploying troops to the Vietnam War. 73 There are other reasons why the claim of Cambodian participation in the Vietnam war as COW describes seems difficult to sustain. Cambodia under the rule of Prince Sihanouk maintained neutrality, and in some regards and during some periods leaned to the Communist side, including tolerating (to various degrees) the basing of Communist troops on Cambodian soil. 75 Hence, though Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese government worked closely together, the Camp Holloway attack is probably not best identified as one state attacking another state.
We have a different coding of the outcome of the Vietnam War than does COW. COW codes the war as ending in a North Vietnamese victory in April 1975. We code the US and its nonSouth Vietnam allies as experiencing a draw in January 1973. Some may propose that the Vietnam War must be viewed as a defeat for the US and its allies, even as of 1973. The core rationale for the draw coding is that the Paris Peace Accords at face accomplished some important US goals. North Vietnam's core goal was the subversion of the non-Communist government in Saigon, a goal it had formally approved as far back as 1959, pursuing this goal through ever escalating support of Communist insurgency in South Vietnam, and eventually through deployment of North Vietnamese troops to South Vietnamese territory. 76 From the outset of the war, the core US goals were to eliminate violent North Vietnamese subversion of the South Vietnamese government. For example, in August 1964, soon after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the US offered economic aid to North Vietnam, and accordingly avoidance of American hostility, if North Vietnam ended the insurgency in South Vietnam. 77 The Paris Peace Accords de jure accomplished this goal, in the sense that the agreement allowed for South Vietnamese self-determination, forbidding foreign countries from interfering. The Accords also reflected concessions on the part of North Vietnam, including dropping the demand that the ruling South Vietnamese government be replaced by a coalition. These concessions were probably driven by the 1972 American "Linebacker II" bombing campaign, 78 and occurred in the context of a ground combat/pacification environment that had been improving, from the American point of view, since 1969. 79 That said, the agreement certainly did not accomplish all American goals, as the agreement recognized the right of the Viet Cong to participate in South Vietnam's process of self-determination.
Some might reply that the unexpected human costs paid by the United States justify coding this as a defeat for the US. Notwithstanding our general approach of ignoring costs when assessing outcomes, this view underestimates Communist casualties. Indeed, Communist casualties dwarfed American casualties, both in absolute and relative terms (that is, casualties as a percentage of the total population). American military deaths from 1965-1974 were 46,000, compared to some 951,000 Communist deaths. 80 We 82 Several historians agree that the accord offered essentially no pause in the fighting between North and South Vietnam. Harry Summers wrote that "the agreement was almost immediately violated by both sides." 83 Lewis Sorley: "Very soon after the Paris Accords were signed the North Vietnamese resumed their attacks. Their task was made easy by the thirteen NVA divisions and 75 regiments-an estimated 160,000 troops in all-still in place in South Vietnam." 84 Micheal Clodfelter: "Nixon claimed the attainment of his 'peace with honor,' but the war had ended only for America. Having endured for so long, the conflict refused to end. The cease-fire broke down almost immediately." 85 22. COW 4.0 codes Pakistan as winning the 1965 Rann of Kutch War, claiming India concedes to allow a plebiscite. That war is better coded as a draw. The Soviets mediated the peace deal, and though they supported India they also wanted to restrict Chinese influence in Pakistan, so they did not want to damage Pakistan's interests too greatly. 86 The peace deal, the Tashkent Declaration, required both sides to withdraw to their prewar borders (at war's end, each side possessed some of the other side's prewar territory). Here is one summary of the peace deal, stressing mutual concessions: "The importance of the Tashkent Declaration lay in that it represented important concessions on both sides. The Indians gave up strategic positions captured in the Azad Kashmir region, and the Pakistanis agreed to withdraw from territory that they had seized in the conflict. The Indians backed down from their original position that Pakistan acknowledge its responsibility for guerilla infiltration. Apart from conceding the strategic positions of the Haji Pir pass and Titwal, which brought about domestic discontent, [Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri] gave up little at Tashkent. (Brines, 1968, p. 405) [Pakistani President Muhammed] Ayub [Khan], however, came away without having achieved much. As a result the 1965 war, and more importantly, its outcomes probably marked the beginning of Ayub's end." 87 As to the specific plebiscite issue, there are a few reasons why the plebiscite commitment is not enough rationale to justify coding Pakistan as winning. First, India had committed in principle to a plebiscite in Kashmir as early as the late 1940s. 88 That is, any commitment to a plebiscite at the end of the 1965 War does not represent a change in India's previous diplomatic position. Second two sides, and it makes no mention of a plebiscite. 89 Other sources do not indicate an Indian commitment to a plebiscite as part of the peace deal. 90 Third, in its conceptual discussion of war outcomes, COW makes reference to scholarly consensus about war outcome. Yet, it does not refer to any sources that indicate that argue that Pakistan won. Indeed, some specialists make the exact opposite claim, that Pakistan actually lost the war: "Clearly, Pakistan was compelled by the military situation to accept India's insistence upon restoring the status quo ante, with only minimum face-saving provisions in the UN resolution for some future consideration of the problems for which the country had embarked on war. This was, perhaps, the strongest indication that, for all practical purposes, Pakistan had lost the conflict." 91 Relatedly, some argue that India got the better deal in the Tashkent Declaration: "Even though Shastri died during the [Tashkent] talks, India got the best deal. Initially Pakistan tried to argue for the liberation of Kashmir on the basis of self-determination, a diplomatic solution to its failure to gain its military objectives, but India really achieved more by insisting on, and achieving, a restoration of the status quo ante bellum." On February 22, 1973, the sides signed a formal peace agreement, "Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos." The agreement is a ceasefire, calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos, a return of all prisoners, and that within 60 days the establishment of the Provisional Government and National Coalition Council. This was a framework for national conciliation, without spelling out important details.
COW codes the war as ending in April 1973 despite the signature of the February agreement, probably because there was some ongoing combat after the February agreement, including hundreds of American B-52 sorties, as well as attacks by North Vietnamese and Laotian forces. 95 The fighting tapered off in April, when a follow up Protocol agreement was signed, filling out the details of the new governance structure. The Protocol was a power-sharing agreement between the Lao government and the Pathet Lao. Some observers view the Protocol as representing gains for the Pathet Lao, 96 but others disagree, noting that some Pathet Lao demands were not met, as refugees were not required to return to their villages, cease-fires lines were viewed as somewhat fluid, government officials could travel throughout the country (including in Pathet Lao controlled areas), the Pathet Lao's deputy premier was not seen to be superior to the government's deputy premier, and the date of the next general elections was not established. 97 COW codes the war as ending in North Vietnamese victory. The argument seems to be not that the April 1973 agreement represented a Pathet Lao victory, but rather that eventually the Pathet Lao eventually took over: "The fighting in Laos died out relatively soon after that, with the war ending in April 1973. On September 14, 1973, a coalition government was created in Laos, including all the factions; however, the Pathet Lao gradually took over the government."
98 As discussed in the text, we code outcome based on the achievement of political goals at wars' end, not whether or not goals were achieved in the months or years following wars' end. Accordingly, we code the war as ending in a draw, concurring with COW's ending date of April 17, 1973. 25. War of Attrition. COW codes this as a stalemate between Egypt and Israel, because "neither side was achieving its aims."
99 This assessment is difficult to support, for two reasons. First, COW does not describe what the aims of the two sides were. Second, the context clearly indicates that Egypt failed to accomplish its aims, and Israel did accomplish its aims. Egypt's aims were to persuade Israel to abandon some or all of its territorial positions in the Sinai peninsula. In this, it failed. Indeed, in the course of the war Israel acquired more Egyptian territory, seizing Shadwan Island in the Gulf of Suez. Israel accomplished all of its goals of maintaining its territorial position. Some might claim that Egypt's true goal was simply to degrade the Israeli military, but here Egypt failed as well, in that Israel lost 260 KIA to Egypt's 5,000 or so civilians and soldiers killed. 27. COW 4.0 codes Pakistan as initiating the 1971 Bangladesh War. India should be coded as initiating. The broader context is that in 1971, a human rights crisis in East Pakistan (the region that eventually became the nation of Bangladesh) drew India's interest and escalating involvement. Artillery and small arms fire exchanges across the India-East Pakistan border began as early as May, but these actions were of insufficient intensity to mark the beginning of the war. We mark the war as beginning in November, when India troops began to cross the border with East Pakistan "in strength." These Indian troops began to seize and secure enclaves of territory permitting the operations of Bandladeshi rebel groups (Schanberg 1971 ). On November 20, an Indian infantry division attacked a village on the East Pakistan side of the border, and Indian attacks soon escalated. COW codes Pakistan as initiating the war, because of the December 3 Pakistani airstrike on Indian airfields. However, there was enough Indian aggression prior to the airstrike to justify coding India as initiator. 103 The authors of a leading history of the war declare: "[December 3] is usually cited for the commencement of the third Indo-Pakistani war, and because of the air strikes, Pakistan is often depicted as having taken the initiative in starting the war. In more realistic, rather than formal, terms, however, the war began on 21 November, when Indian military units occupied Pakistani territory as part of the preliminary phase of the offensive directed at capturing and liberating Dhaka." 107 in general outcomes should be coded using criteria other than belligerents' public claims that they won.
The more important questions are, what were Chinese goals, and did they accomplish them? China's military goal appeared to be to inflict costs on Vietnam. Accomplishing the military goal of inflicting costs might serve one of two possible political goals. First, it can be part of a coercion campaign, inflicting costs on the target coupled with a demand that the target take some action. However, Vietnam did not respond to the invasion by making any concessions. Second, demonstrating an ability to inflict costs on Vietnam might be a means of demonstrating Chinese military power and the willingness to use force. Some view this as China's fundamental motive. It is difficult to assess whether accomplishing the military goal of inflicting costs allowed China to accomplish its longer term political goals, and notably, we restrict ourselves to evaluating whether or not a state accomplished its goals at the end of the war. 108 We code this war as a draw. China accomplished no specific political goals at war's end, such as territorial acquisition, Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, or a Vietnamese commitment to better treatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam. There were perhaps some indirect effects with mixed consequences for each side, such as the war demonstrating the limits of Soviet willingness to aid Vietnam. King Chen summarized the mixed outcome of the war as follows: "In spite of the fact that both China and Vietnam claimed a victory over the other, neither had achieved its major objectives. So far as China is concerned, its publicized limited objectives were only partially obtained. First of all, it had not destroyed any of Vietnam's strong divisions. Second it was unable to make the border area free from armed conflicts. Third, it had not forced the Vietnamese army to withdraw from Cambodia. Fourth, it failed to influence the Hanoi government to change its policy toward Chinese residents in Vietnam. On the other side of the ledger, China had raised doubts in Hanoi about Soviet willingness to intervene with force against China. Moreover, the PRC had also obtained some support from the ASEAN for its attempt to stop further Vietnam's further move in Southeast Asia, and it had caused an immediate ill-effect on the Vietnamese economy." 110 This is clearly an Israeli victory. Israel's main goal was to eject the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon. Israel accomplished this goal, and also secured territorial control of southern Lebanon to improve the security of northern Israel. Syria failed to prevent Israel from establishing an enduring foothold in Lebanon, or from ejecting the PLO. Syria did maintain troops in Lebanon in the years that followed the 1982 war, but had had troops in Lebanon since the 1970s. The war may have created a long term strategic, political problem for Israel, but our approach is to code outcomes based on accomplishment of goals at the end of the war, rather than on assessing whether or not the war helped a belligerent achieve long term grand strategy goals. An important question to ask is whether the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait qualifies as a war. We find that it does not, because of insufficient casualties. The data on casualties during the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are poor, though all sources claim that the 16,000 strong Kuwaiti military put up little resistance, surrendering the capital about four hours after the invasion began. In the words of one major study of the Gulf War: "The Iraqi land force met virtually no resistance." 111 On August 5, 1990, the Sunday Times (London) reported that Kuwaiti hospital sources indicated that some 600-800 Kuwaitis had been killed since the commencement of fighting, but that report does not indicate whether that figure is for civilian deaths, military deaths, or both. 112 The Kuwaiti government claimed in December 1990 that 4,200 Kuwaiti soldiers had been killed during the invasion, but that figure may or may not include post-invasion deaths from the occupation. 113 Later, a 1994 publication, based on Kuwaiti government documents, lists a total of 99 Kuwaiti soldiers killed during the August 2 invasion. 114 Clodfelter (632) provides no estimates of Kuwaiti casualties, and allows that no more than 200 Iraqis died in the conquest. 115 On balance, the best judgment is that there were probably far fewer than 1000 battle casualties during the few hours of combat, probably no more than a few hundred at most.
Civil War as interstate wars (they are now coded by COW as intrastate wars). Second, it is not clear that the JNA troops in Yugoslavia should be deemed as agents of the Serbian government. Resort to War refers to them as "former JNA members." They were under the command of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and had been technically released from the JNA, though they still received support from Belgrade. 117 35. Regarding the 1995 Cenepa War, COW 4.0 codes this month-long episode as an interstate war. We exclude this as a war, because there is not enough data to suggest that there were at least 1000 battle dead. Clodfelter estimates 78 dead. 118 Herz and Nogueira report the following: "There are no reliable sources for the number of casualties in the Cenepa War. Bonilla estimates deaths at 1,500, based on confidential reports from Ecuadorian offices. Generals Gallardo and Paco Moncayo, respectively defense minister and army commander at the time; Colonel Luis Hernandez, commander of one of the main units involved in the fighting; and Lieutenant-Colonel Luis Aguas, who also participated directly in operations, considered that number extremely high and agreed roughly on no more than 500 casualties, most of them on the Peruvian side. We had no access to Peruvian estimates of casualties." 119 Official Ecuadorian government estimates were 34 Ecuadorian soldiers killed, and official Peruvian government estimates were 50 Peruvian soldiers killed. 120 Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes estimate 300-400 dead, noting that, "The 'fog of war' in the jungle made it difficult to distinguish fact from fiction and the value of official claim from counterclaim." 121 The Uppsala Armed Conflict Data claims that hundreds were killed. The Bonilla conference paper was eventually published as a chapter in an edited volume. The Sarkees and Wayman book was published in 2010, and in 2012 Mares and Palmer published a book on the Ecuador-Peru rivalry. 124 In the Mares and Palmer book, they are a bit equivocal, in one place (1) indicating that casualties ranged from published estimates in the 200-300 range to unpublished estimates ranging as high as 4500, though in another place in the text they simply refer to published estimates of 100-300 (38). Their sources are as follows. First, there is an interview with an Ecuadorean diplomat estimating as many as 4000 casualties. 125 Second, there is the Bonilla paper. Third, there is a 1996/1997 Security Studies article by Mares, in which he claimed that "reliable unofficial estimates put the dead at over 1,000 during 34 days of fighting," though there is no reference or citation to support this claim. 126 It is worth noting that there were about 10,000 troops involved in the war, and a fatality rate of 10% (getting to the COW minimum threshold of 1000) would indicate intense conventional combat, probably more intense than probably occurred. By comparison, the Battle of the Bulge in 1944-45, also a 30 day campaign, experienced about 10% fatalities, and that was one of the more intense battles in the 1944-45 campaign to defeat Germany.
36. Regarding the 1999 Kosovo War, COW codes several non-US NATO nations as belligerents. Given the COW coding rule that a belligerent must contribute at least 1000 troops or suffer 100 casualties, this war is better off coded with the US as the only participant, versus Serbia. There were no NATO casualties during the war. In terms of troops involved, only about 375 non-US aircraft were involved, spread across as many 13 countries, and most of those aircraft contained crews of a single pilot. 127 We do not code NATO aerial support crews as combatants, as neither the airbases in Italy hosting NATO aircraft nor the aircraft carriers deployed to the Adriatic Sea risked being attacked by Serbian naval or aerial forces.
